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Abstract 
Corporate governance has come to the forefront of academic research due to the vital role it plays in the overall 
health of economic systems. The wave of U.S. corporate fraud in the 1990s was attributed to deficiencies in 
corporate governance. The recent 2008-2009 global financial crisis, triggered by the unprecedented failure of 
Lehman Brothers and the subprime mortgage problems, renewed interest in the role corporate governance plays 
in the financial sector. The development of a strong corporate governance framework is important to protect 
stakeholders, maintain investor confidence in the transition countries and attract foreign direct investment.   
Corporate governance concerns the design of decision-making structures relating to a firm's choice of new 
investment projects and the operation of its existing ones. The appropriate focus here is on the factors that 
influence the decisions at the top of a corporation. Internal controls beyond those applied to the directors and top 
managers, important as they are for a well-functioning corporation, do not involve issues of corporate 
governance. Rather, they are part of the tools of good administration needed by any organization, whether a 
government ministry, a for-profit corporation, or a nonprofit organization. Such internal controls simply assure 
that the organization as a whole behaves in accordance with the decisions and goals of top management. 
The purpose of this study is to contribute for central and eastern Europe countries to understand the differences 
between views regarding the content of the concept on corporate governance and its management role. From the 
other side we would like to explain in shortly the sources of corporate governance, stages of market 
transformation, corporate governance indicators, responsible of the managers to lead the corporate governance 
and the types of the relationships between governing and management functions in companies in Central 
European transitional economies. 
The paper compares the different levels of corporate governance established among the transition countries.  
Keywords – corporate governance, transition countries, emerging economies, etc. 
 
1. Introduction 
The transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe have privatized their economies at an unprecedented 
speed in the 1990s. The expectation was that under private ownership, for merely state-owned firms would act as 
dynamic, and profit oriented players driving economic restructuring and growth. Yet, the expectation has rarely 
been fulfilled, and lack of effective corporate governance is often seen as a culprit.  
Normatively assessing a firm's corporate governance involves two considerations. One is the 
effectiveness of the firm as a creator of value: its capacity to give back to society resources of greater value than 
what it takes. The other is the fairness with which the firm treats those who have to deal with it on a longer-term 
basis, including non-control equity shareholders. 
 
2. The Sources of Corporate Governance 
We think that the process of identifying definitions for the concept of corporate governance facilitates and the 
understanding of differences between views regarding the content of this concept need to consider in all of 
organizations in public and private sector. The first attempt to explain the concept of corporate governance 
belongs to Berle and Means (1932) who consider that corporate responsibility refers to the "equitable control" 
that managers must exert to meet the interests of shareholders.  A widely used definition belongs to the Cadbury 
Committee (Mallin, 2007): "the system by which companies are directed and controlled". Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) approach corporate governance while having in mind the means by which "resource providers" and 
financial investors ensure the profitability of their investments. Corporate governance can mean: leadership, 
organizational structures and processes that help ensure that an organization’s functions sustain and extend its 
strategies and objectives. Put more simply, it is the culture, policies, procedures and controls that help ensure a 
company will meet its business goals.” (Lamm, 2010a), "a system of rules and norms, of either institutional or 
market nature, within which various categories of stakeholders, shareholders, management, public 
administration, staff, customers, suppliers, etc.  arise or develop" (Bostan and  Bostan, 2010), "a concept that  
encompasses a wide range of  activities, rules, processes and procedures designed to ensure optimal use of 
resources and corporate  strategies in order to meet its objectives " (Dobroţeanu et al., 2011). 
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The development of the concept of corporate governance was made in connection with a number of theories. The 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) dominates other theoretical  approaches of corporate governance and 
extends the basis theory on the separation of ownership  from control, analysing the relationships between those 
who delegate authority (shareholders) and  those who perform services to the benefit of the  former (CEOs), as a 
consequence of information  asymmetry. Recent research demonstrates the implications of transaction costs on 
resource allocation and on the structure of organizations (Iacobuţă and Frunză, 2006). Transaction cost theory 
states that the transaction is the basic unit of analysis in economics; economic governance is essential to 
optimizing resource allocation and increasing economic efficiency (Williamson, 1975). Stewardship theory 
shows that managers, as administrators of the business, are inclined to meet the interests of shareholders 
(Donaldson, 1990). This theory eliminates the idea of personal interests, arguing that variations in performance 
obtained by managers are determined by their position. Stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) 
provides a legal framework for the inclusion of stakeholders in the managerial decision-making process (Crane 
and Ruebottom, 2011). The main goal of management should be to create value and satisfaction for all 
stakeholders (Aggarwal and Chandra, 1990; Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000). In this context, some research 
sought to analyze the topic of shareholder value versus stakeholder orientation based on empirical studies of 
managers from top U.S., UK and European companies (Stadler et al., 2006). 
A series of corporate governance models have been individualized in scholarly literature.  Albert (1993) 
distinguishes two models of corporate governance: shareholder value model (AngloSaxon model) and 
stakeholder’s model (Rhineland model). De Jong (1997) considers that there are three alternative models of 
corporate governance: American (Anglo-Saxon or market-oriented system), continental (Germanic or network-
oriented system) and Latin (represented by companies from Italy, France, Spain, etc.). Yoshimori (1995) 
believes that we can identify three distinct concepts related to corporate governance: "monistic, dualistic and 
pluralistic". In another vision (Bostan and Bostan, 2010), the two models of corporate governance are: the 
“insider system” model and the “outsider system” model. 
 
3. Corporate Governance in Transition Countries 
The difference in the corporate governance problem in transition countries is one of controlling versus minority 
shareholders problem. The early privatization of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) resulted in mostly 
concentrated ownership by dominant or block- shareholders, (institutional investors - Hungary, management 
buyout (MBOs) or management-employee buyouts (MEBOs) - Poland, employee-owners – Czech), giving these 
controlling shareholders considerable greater control over corporate assets than their stock ownership warranted. 
Of even greater concern than the concentrated ownership is the prevalence of complex ownership structures 
through cross-shareholdings, multiple-class shareholdings with different voting rights, pyramidal corporate 
shareholdings. A landmark study by Bebchuk et al (1999) shows that “expropriation costs” are very large when 
such complex shareholdings are used to increase control rights beyond their cash- flow rights, even larger than 
concentrated ownerships.  The role of corporate governance to under girth weak competitive market mechanisms 
and democratic political institutions is the complementing factor necessary to sustain the long-term 
modernization of the transition countries. In other words, the “principal- agent” relationship that governs most 
capitalist societies that provides the incentives and environment in which investors (principals) can reap the 
profits of their investment through their corporations (agents) and the behavioral relationship are determined by a 
set of corporate governance standards. EBRD’s Legal Indicator Surveys reports that transition countries have an 
implementation gap between the enactment of laws and its enforcement. Unlike developed countries in the 
United States and United Kingdom with widely dispersed shareholders, the principal-agent corporate governance 
problems are primarily due to the agent (manager) perpetrating embezzlement and fraud. The corporate 
governance regime of the English legal origins (US-UK) emphasizes the protection of shareholders from being 
expropriated by the firm’s management. In contrast, the European legal origin countries (French-German) 
emphasize the protection of stakeholders (state, block holders, employees) from expropriation. A relationship-
based system and investor expropriation tends to prevail in emerging economies. In Russia, Bulgaria and 
elsewhere mass privatization enriched the oligarchs and the politically well connected. The “cronyism” and 
relationship-based structure carried over from the communist era with most of the post- communist corporate 
owners part of the politically connected or political elite is difficult to root out. The lack of effective corporate 
governance, in particular, Russia, engenders a hostile business environment: corruption, organized crime, a bias 
judicial system and government interference. In the post-socialist European countries, the set of corporate 
governance standards adopted varies which may depend on past legal heritage. The group of Central and Eastern 
Europe and Baltic (CEEB) nations has a German legal heritage which includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The group of South East 
European (SEE) nations has a French legal heritage which includes the Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bosnia 
and Albania.  
The last group consists of most of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Pistor (2000) finds 
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that past legal heritage is not significant in explaining what predominant system of legal structure will be 
adopted by the transition countries. Rather, the adoption during the initial transformation period is driven more 
by the desire to converge with the EU legal system with an eye to attaining accession or the US system. Pistor 
also observes that differences in legal reforms among the transition countries are due primarily to policy makers 
responding to economic changes: greater privatization engenders better protection of creditor’s and stockholder’s 
rights or whether the dominant external advisors are from the US or EU. Mahoney (2001) similarly argues that a 
nation directly or indirectly adopts a set of legal structure in response to change rather than solely because of its 
past legal heritage. Poland and the Czech Republic are good examples of differences in privatization, corporate 
governance development and economic growth.  
An interesting study by Coffee (1999) compares the differences between Poland and the Czech 
Republic experience. Both countries adopted corporate law system based on the German civil law heritage. The 
important difference is that despite the German heritage, Poland’s securities regulations and practices follow the 
common law system of the Anglo-American more closely: greater private ownership protection, stringent 
disclosure standards and a strong enforcing securities commission agency. Coffee concludes (1) that better 
securities regulation to protect minority shareholders from expropriation is more effective than ineffective 
corporate laws, (2) that the Anglo-American common laws structure of corporate governance outperforms the 
German-French civil law structure despite their legal heritage. The result is the successful growth of equity 
financing for businesses in Poland with a growing healthy growing stock market. The Polish stock market is one 
of the largest among the transition countries with a market capitalization of U$175.85 billion in 2010; in 
contrast, the Czech Republic stock market capitalization is only U$68,831.   
 
4. Stages of Market Transformation 
Transition economies are former centrally planned economies undergoing unprecedented, comprehensive 
transformations to market-driven economies (World Bank,2002). Planned and market economies are opposing 
economic systems adhering to different institutional frameworks (King, 2001; Martin, 2002; Peng, 2003; 
Williamson, 1995). An institutional framework is a set of formal constraints such as legal and regulative 
systems; and informal constraints such as social values, codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions 
that regulate human behavior and economic activity (e.g., the use of norms of trade associations to regulate 
exchanges; social pressure to ensure that parties perform their duties) (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). The 
institutional framework associated with a centrally planned economy, which we label the bureaucratic control 
institutional framework, principally underlies public ownership, state coordination, redistribution, and control 
(Boisot & Child, 1988; Kornai, 1990). The institutional framework associated with a market economy (market 
institutional framework) principally underlies private ownership and market transactions (Kornai, 1990; 
Williamson,1995). Institutional theorists assert that the replacement of an institutional framework with a new 
one often occurs in three stages: dominance of the old framework, emergence of an interim framework with 
some elements of both frameworks, and finally prevalence of a new framework (Benson,1977; Gerry, 2000; 
Lachmann,1979; North,1990). We suggest transformation from bureaucratic control to the market institutional 
framework is likely to go through an interim (intermediate) stage, during which the formal rules associated with 
the centrally planned system weaken rapidly. The new market rules evolve slowly, forcing various constituents 
to rely on informal constraints (Lachmann, 1979; McMillan & Woodruff, 2000; Peng, 2003; Peng & Heath, 
1996). The intermediate period therefore can be defined as the relational stage dominated by a relational 
institutional framework (Peng, 2003). Although one institutional framework is dominant in a particular stage, the 
three institutional frameworks tend to coexist during the transition process, and together constitute a larger 
societal institutional environment (Benson,1977; North,1990). Extant literature on transition economies 
documents the existence of three stages. The factors inherent in the bureaucratic control stage (i.e., state 
ownership, intervention, and redistribution) have been reported in various studies (e.g.,  Andreff,1999; King, 
2001; Kornai, 1990; McCarthy & Puffer, 2003; Stark, 1994; Suhomlinova,1999). Andreff (1999) showed that in 
1995, after six years of transition, the average state ownership in former socialist economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe was 58 percent; among them the Czech Republic had the lowest level of state ownership (31%), 
and Tajikistan and Turkmenistan had the highest (85%). The existence of a relational stage is also well 
documented (e.g., King,2001; McMillan & Woodruff, 2000; Peng, 2003; Peng & Heath, 1996). These studies 
have demonstrated that widespread, relationship-based exchange tends to emerge systematically in transition 
economies due to the absence of formal, market-based laws and regulations. Finally, some transition economies 
(e.g., those of the Czech Republic and Poland) have now progressed to the late stage of transition as they now 
have an advanced market institutional framework (Tihanyi & Roath, 2002). We do not focus on the investigation 
of how transition economies progress. Instead, we assume transition economies are committed to transforming to 
a market economy and are likely to go through the three stages we specify. We believe that bracketing the 
transition process into different stages with fairly distinct institutional trajectories is useful in examining the 
impact of institutions and institutional changes on corporate governance in transition economies.  
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5. Towards responsible corporate governance. 
Recently, a new approach to corporate governance has been developed which relieson the assumption that man is 
free an dresponsible (Aras and Crowther, 2010). On this basis, corporations are viewed as communities off 
reeand responsible persons engaged in a creative project, able to contribute to the commongood. The terms 
"good corporate governance" or "responsible corporate governance" are usedever more often in scholarly 
literature. Bad governanceis being in creasingly regarded as one of the underlying causes of all evil in 
oursocieties (Shil, 2008).  
 
6. Corporate Governance environment in Croatia   
After privatization process started in 1991, interest in corporate governance has been raising parallel to the 
growth in private sector. Improvement in corporate governance is seen through better access to capital, 
promoting efficient performance and development, transparency compared to European requirements and rules 
and accountability. In consideration to corporate governance there is also some important issues to be mentioned, 
primarily related to the history of social ownership and all aspects of adjustments in transition period. 
Privatization process was undergone according to the model, which was severely criticized in public and because 
of that partly cased inefficient industry sector. The weak side of privatization model was that some enterprises 
are privatized without inflow of new capital and ex managers begun new owners without investing their own 
money. A consequence was inadequate composition of boards and in many cases performance was unproductive 
and inefficient. In Croatia managing of enterprises is regulated by Company Act following German law, while 
the Securities Law are regulated mostly against Anglo-American securities market legislation. Now, Croatia is in 
the process of reviewing all legislatives according Directives of the European Union.  Croatian system of boards 
is two-tier. Supervisory Board is responsible for monitoring enterprise leadership and thus could investigate all 
record keeping and documentation, cash etc. regarding business performance. Top Management (called 
Managerial Board or Board of Directors) are committed to inform Supervisory Board about business policies, 
profitability, income statement, liquidity etc. at least once a year. Guiding corporate strategy and corporate 
performance including interests of stakeholders is not the function of Supervisory Board. The emphasis is on 
monitoring performance through financial data and that is the main difference between Board of Directors and 
Supervisory Board. Supervisory Board members chosen by the owner have in many cases only formal role of 
monitoring and their influence on enterprise performance is disputable. In the case of mixed ownership or small 
shareholder ownership, members of Supervisory Board are chosen at the basis of skill and they are more 
accountable for efficiency performance of enterprise (Vitezi, 2003). In public enterprises Supervisory Board is 
selected upon party representation. Managerial Board main role is responsibility for running business affairs, i.e. 
business politics, profitable performance and others affairs. It consists of several members and one of them is 
chairman, usually owner. They are confirmed by Supervisory Board and could be hired or fired by them. But the 
role of Managerial Board is stronger especially in the cases where the Supervisory Board is only a formal body 
and has not much influence to the enterprises decision- making process (stated owned enterprises). Comparing to 
the recent literature on the subject (Nadler, 2004) there are different types of boards: passive, certifying, 
engaged, intervening and operating. Operating makes key decisions that other directors and managers then 
implements, and this kind of board is the most similar to the one exist in Croatia. They are responsible for 
business policies of the enterprise and in the case include the one main owner if he is the only one. The tendency 
should be on high performance board, which will be competent, coordinated, collegial and focused on an 
unambiguous goal.  With changing from social to market oriented economy many believed that these changes 
would help enterprises to gain competitive advantages and therefore contribute in increasing national efficiency. 
Privatization is based on the premise that it will improve enterprises performance and help countries grow. But 
the effects are different on aggregate or micro level and depend on industry structure. In a cross-country 
aggregate study, Sachs, Zinnes and Eilat (2000, Vol.III) state that privatization does not by itself increase GDP 
growth, but they suggest that a positive effect is present when privatization is accompanied by in-depth 
institutional reforms. Applicable to Croatian economy, inflation rate is low and decreasing from 6.2 per cent in 
2000 to 2.1 in 2004. and GDP rate vary from 2.9 per cent in 2000. to 5.6 per cent in 2002, decreasing to 3.3 per 
cent in 2004. It is obvious that institutional reforms but also more important stabilization, industry restructuring, 
financial discipline and new investment are prerequisite for increasing of macroeconomic indicators. 
Additionally, privatization force enterprises restructuring and therefore is accompanied with changes in 
management, corporate governance and organization structure.  
 
7. Corporate governance indicators   
In this research corporate governance indicators are considered through some attributes of boards, particularly 
their structure, size, independence, internationalization, diversity, frequency of meetings and others. Disclosure 
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is investigated through existing information especially about board members, remuneration disclosure and 
adoption of ethics code. The results are as follows: Board structure.  In Croatia companies have two-tire system 
(as in Germany, Austria, France, etc.–in fact, only 23 percent in Europe) comprising a Supervisory board of 
outside members close to the owners, and a separate Managerial Board of executive directors. The two boards 
meet separately with strictly defined accountability under the law. Concerning board internationalization, in 
Europe boards are more domestic with only 16 per cent of non-national directors, than the companies 
themselves. Contrary to the surveyed companies, the percentage of foreign members (one or few) in Supervisory 
or Managerial board is higher (20.8 per cent) in Croatia.  Average ages of boards are in 68 per cent up to 45 year 
if the majority ownership is foreign, and in the rest of 31.8 per cent of enterprises are from 25 and 35 years. In 
domestic enterprises there are 82 per cent of them up to 45. Board member’s average age in Europe is 55 years. 
On average, directors have been 5.6 years on the same board what are little over than in Croatia (around 5 years). 
In the European board, the number of women increases from 6 to 7 per cent. In Croatia this percentage is much 
lower and is less than 1 per cent in Supervisory board. Only in Managerial board, women contribute with over 10 
per cent.   
 
8. Board size 
The number of board size could not be considered as a factor, which determines efficient performance or has 
crucial impact to performance. There are a few reasons for explanation of this statement. First, board size is 
commonly determined by national law or listing requirements. Second, it is mostly based on the enterprise size 
and sector and therefore considered “appropriate”. Third, the knowledge of each member is very important for 
the efficiency of board decision- making. The emphasize is on effective board no matter of size, which means 
that board should be of sufficient size and the balance of skills and experience is ap to the requirements of the 
business. In Croatia the average board (Supervisory) size is five and in accordance to the law minimum size is 3 
and maximum 21 members depending on equity amount. Croatia average is still lower than the minimum size in 
Germany (8) and Austria (6) who has the same two-tier model. This could be explained by the size of enterprises 
and structure of owners. In Croatia 95 per cent of total enterprises are small, mostly with no obligations to have 
supervisory board.  
Middle sized and large enterprises contribute with rest five per cent and in majority have one or few 
owners. In some research made by Čengi (2001) it is confirmed that chair persons of boards (Supervisory and 
Management) with domestic owners are in the most cases long term employees or managers of these firms from 
the period before privatization process started. Additionally, they have essential influence on processes relating 
to the structure of Supervisory or Managerial board. Independence of board Croatian board name Supervisory 
board is not independent related to the law requirements and German model of two-tire board structure. 
Considering separation of chairman and CEO, two-tire board structure ensures the separation of roles.  
The member of the Supervisory board could not be at the same time a member of Managerial board.  
Audit committee beginning of the 2001, after starting accounting scandals, the role of audit committee has come 
under close scrutiny. The audit committee responsibilities are to monitor and review the integrity of enterprise 
financial statements, its internal financial controls, the external auditor’s independence and objectivity and the 
effectiveness of the audit process as a whole. Hence, the independence of audit committee is very important for 
its effectiveness. The independence of the audit committee is 64.5 per cent and varies considerably from 
minimum 4 per cent of companies with a majority independent audit committee in Japan to over 95 per cent in 
UK, Netherlands, Canada, USA, Ireland and Luxembourg (Maier, 2005).  
 
9. Disclosure 
In addition to all information company should include in disclosure, the remuneration policy pay attention to 
shareholders and others, particularly because of the relation with enterprise performance. Remuneration also 
should motivate members of boards to run the company successfully, but remuneration level should be 
determinate with contribution to the efficiency growth. Croatian enterprises mostly (80 per cent of them) not 
disclose information on the remuneration of Supervisory or Managerial board members. This is regarded as good 
practice and from the survey of 24 countries in the world (Maier, 2005), the average of disclose is 84 per cent.  
Comparing the frequency of board meetings with remuneration, the average compensation per board meeting in 
Europe is 7,301 EURO per 2005. (Albert- Roulhac, and Breen, 2005). In Croatia Company Law defines 
frequency of board meetings. Supervisory board is committed to have quarterly meetings or at least semi-yearly. 
The average meetings as result from questionnaire are 6. (5.8 times). The average in Europe countries who has 
two-tier board are 6.7 meetings and is notable that unitary board has more frequent meetings (9.3) comparing 
with two-tire, but also is evident continues slight increase. (Albert-Roulhac, and Breen, 2005). When looking for 
good governance practice, the implementation of code of ethics is highly supported. In recent years a number 
governmental and private initiatives have focused on the need to reduce corruption, bribery, fraud etc. and urged 
a need to improve standards of corporate governance ethics, transparency and integrity. In Europe in average 73 
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per cent of companies have a meaningful code of ethics, and Croatian enterprises are not much below that (70 
per cent). However, existing code of ethics if not strictly implement could not protect against all illegal doings. 
 
10. Main types of relationships between governing and management functions in companies in Central 
European transitional economies 
Two extreme views prevail today regarding the corporate governance system (Kuznetsov& Kuznetsov, 256). 
The new neo-classical school considers shareholders as the only group that governs a company. The corporate 
social responsibility school requires looking beyond the classical concept of shareholders’ wealth by suggesting 
the stakeholders’ approach. Many authors prefer to deal with the so-called outsider (USA, UK) and insider 
(Germany, Japan, other parts of Continental Europe) systems of corporate governance (Gregorič et al., 186). 
Dispersed ownership and liquid capital markets as well as strong investors’ legal protection are an important 
assumption of the outsider corporate governance system. The strong legal protection of creditors, a highly 
concentrated ownership and relatively illiquid capital markets, as well as favouring the stakeholders’ approach 
seem to be the basic assumption of the insider system. 
Legal regulations can allow or forbid the concentration of voting rights in different countries. It is not 
allowed everywhere that shareholders concentrate their voting rights without concentrating ownership. For 
example, Germany and the Netherlands allow it. Banks and other financial companies are not allowed to be 
shareholders in a number of countries. The Anglo-American system does not allow the legal institutionalisation 
of the employee right to share ownership or profit in companies (the right to economic democracy) (Zalar, 37). 
One can find an autonomous corporation surrounded by markets in an Anglo-American environment on one 
hand, and on the other hand, business groups as a typical constellation of corporations, mostly with the financial 
corporation in the centre, in Continental and Northern Europe (Collin & Ceslajs, 163). Taking into account all 
the stated differences, one can better understand the logic and distinctive features of the outsider and insider 
corporate governance systems that we frequently deal with as the Anglo-American and German governance 
models (Rozman, 103). These two models can also be seen as a one-tier and a two-tier model.   
The Anglo-American corporate governance system is based on: 
 The organisation of a large independent corporation 
 A board of directors that is quite independent regarding its shareholders and stakeholders 
 Corporations situated in environments characterised by strong financial markets and small government 
intervention 
 A competitive culture 
 A legal system that discourages ownership by banks and other financial organisations. 
The model consists of two governance bodies: the shareholders’ assembly and the board of directors. Members 
of the board of directors are insiders and outsiders. The board has two main tasks: 1) controlling the business 
results and 2) controlling strategic decisions.  
The German (Continental European) model is based on (Collin & Cesljas, 167): 
 Business group systems that dominate in the economy 
 Weak financial markets 
 A strong government intervention 
 A rather co-operative or authoritarian culture 
 Close connections between corporations and financial organisations. 
The model incorporates three governing bodies: 1) the shareholders’ assembly, 2) the supervisory 
board, and 3) the board of directors. Representatives of employees are also members of the supervisory board. 
Members of the board of directors cannot be outsiders. The main tasks of the supervisory board are to hire and 
fire the board of directors and to supervise the company’s business performance. Mainly the law determines the 
role of the corporate governance function. 
European transitional countries were able to choose between the stated two governance models. Central 
European countries chose mainly a variant of the German model. However, Russian reformers opted for the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance (Kuznetsov&Kuznetsov, 250). E.g., the Republic of 
Macedonia’s Law on Trade Companies introduced a solution that allows both the one-tier and two-tier models 
(Drakulevski, 1132). The Commercial Code determined the corporate governance model in Poland. Its main 
characteristics are derived from the German model. The shareholders’ assembly, the supervisory board, and the 
board of directors are characteristic of the two-tier system. Slovenia and Croatia introduced similar systems. The 
German model applied and the still existing wide dispersion of ownership in Central European transitional 
countries enable top managers to behave rather independently and to hold major power in their hands. The 
described governance power distribution is quite typical for large domestically privatised companies nowadays. 
In the pre-transition period, the governance power was with external owners (governments mostly).  
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11. Conclusion 
The role of corporate governance is manifested in: creating value for the corporation and supporting 
transparency (Lamm, 2010b); protecting shareholders' rights and ensuring their equal treatment, acknowledging 
the interests of all entities that develop relationships with the company, assuming responsibility by the Board of 
Directors, integrity and ethical behaviour, transparency in implementing internal and external control systems to 
certify the validity of corporate financial reports (Dobrotă, et al., 2011). 
The corporate governance function provokes reconsideration everywhere today. We do not believe that 
a uniform corporate governance model will be appropriate for all countries, neither for all transitional countries. 
Historical, cultural, economic and political realities have strong influences on its suitability. In spite of this fact, 
different models will certainly have many common characteristics and they are worth being identified. The 
modest accumulated experiences with the governing practices in Central European transitional countries and 
their analysis can identify the main directions for the future development of corporate governance models in this 
part of Europe. The analysis shows that we need to further develop the stakeholders’ governance model that will 
not deny the central role of owners’ interests in corporate governance. On the other hand, the owners’ interests 
should not be the only ones that are incorporated in the corporate governance process. The corporate governance 
function must start to look beyond just the shareholders’ wealth creation. Knowledge-based industries demand 
highly knowledgeable employees that invest and risk much in providing their expert knowledge. Their 
remuneration is high enough that they are able to accept variable pay systems linked to corporate financial 
performance. They are, therefore, the most important group of stakeholders, beyond owners, entitled to 
participate in corporate governance. We do not see that on this base a workers’ self-management system of 
corporate governance has to be developed. The dominant power within corporate governance has to be balanced 
according to the level of risk that individual stakeholders take over. We believe that investors in companies will 
be those who will carry the biggest risk still for an extended period of time in transitional countries because 
domestic capital is still a very scarce resource in these environments.  
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